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ALU - February 2005: What Impact Will The New Blood Alcohol

WHAT IMPACT WILL THE NEW BLOOD ALCOHOL LIMIT HAVE ON AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS

By: Paul E. D. Darsow

As of August 1, 2005, Minnesota will join forty-seven other states in the nation having a 0.08 percent legal limit for alcohol consumption while driving. Those who follow legislative politics know that one reason for the new legal limit involves the availability of federal highway funds, which is contingent on the existence state laws making 0.08 the legal limit for alcohol consumption. Another reason is the perception that a lower legal limit will force Minnesota drivers to operate their vehicles more responsibly.

Yet the lowering of Minnesota’s legal limit does more than simply assure the availability of additional federal highway funds and increased personal responsibility among drivers. Since 2000, Minnesota law has provided that, in civil actions involving motor vehicle accidents, it is sufficient for the jury to consider an award of punitive damages if there is evidence that the accident was caused by a driver with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. See Mann. Stat. § 169A.76 (2003). That law has also changed to correspond to the new legal limit. According to the new version of Minn. Stat. § 169A.76, “it is sufficient for the jury to consider an award of punitive damages if there is evidence that the accident was caused by a driver with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.”

The new version of Minn. Stat. § 169A.76, like the old version, does not provide that the plaintiff is automatically entitled to receive punitive damages in every case where injury is caused by an intoxicated driver. It states that evidence of intoxication permits entitles the plaintiff to ask the jury for an award of punitive damages in those cases. However, getting the court’s permission to ask the jury for punitive damages is significantly easier than it was prior to the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 169A.76.

To be sure, Minnesota law precludes a plaintiff from asserting a claim for punitive damages in the initial pleading. See Minn. Stat. § 549.191 (2004). After filing the suit, the plaintiff may make a motion to amend the pleadings to assert a claim of punitive damages. See id. However, Minn. Stat. § 549.191 goes on to say that “[t]he motion must allege the applicable legal basis under Minn. Stat. § 549.20 or other law for awarding punitive damages in the action and must be accompanied by one or more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim.” (emphases added). Section 169A.76 certainly qualifies as an “other law for awarding punitive damages”.

The passage of Minn. Stat. § 169A.76 in 2000, is a significant development in its own right. Prior to the enactment of that statute, if an automobile accident plaintiff wanted to make a claim for punitive damages against the defendant driver, Minn. Stat. § 549.20 required that the plaintiff present the court with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with “deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.” Applying Minn. Stat. § 549.20 to the plaintiff’s motion for punitive damages meant that a plaintiff had to present the court with clear and convincing evidence of fairly egregious facts beyond simple evidence of the defendant’s intoxication before the court would allow the plaintiff to ask the jury to award punitive damages. See e.g., Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784, 786 (Minn. App.1984) (claim for punitive damages allowed where unlicensed driver with 0.28 blood-alcohol concentration operated vehicle erratically, driving through plaintiffs’ front yard, before crashing into plaintiffs’ living room). Under that standard, it was not unusual for a court to deny a motion for punitive damages, even though the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. See e.g., Nhep v. Roisen, 446 N.W.2d 425 (Minn.App. 1989) (upholding trial court’s refusal to submit punitive damage issue to jury, although rear-ending driver had blood alcohol level of .20 after accident and might have fallen asleep at wheel). The Minnesota Court of Appeals has not been comfortable with that result, as indicated by dictum in the Nhep decision: “Although we are sympathetic to appellant’s claim, a decision that blood alcohol level alone demonstrates [deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others] should come from legislative action.” 446 N.W.2d at 427. Judge Foley, in a separate concurring opinion stated: “It is my view that the time has come for the legislature to enact appropriate legislation that driving under the influence alone constitutes egregious conduct warranting the submitting of the issue of punitive damages to the jury in automobile accident cases.” Id. at 428. The reason? “Punitive damages can be a real deterrent to drunk driving.” Id.

The legislature’s passage of Minn. Stat. § 169A.76 in 2000 seems responsive to the sentiments expressed in Nhep. By its terms, automobile accident plaintiffs can argue that proof of the defendant’s intoxication by itself, provides an automobile accident plaintiff with a legal basis for asking the jury to award punitive damages against the defendant. The plaintiff apparently does not have to support the motion for punitive damages with clear and convincing proof of any egregious facts in addition to the defendant’s intoxication. Although Nhep seems indicative of how the appellate courts would interpret the interplay between Minn. Stat. § 169A.76, there are currently no appellate court cases which absolve the automobile accident plaintiff from having to support a motion for punitive damages with clear and convincing evidence of a deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others. However, some district court judges have declined to so interpret Minn. Stat. § 169A.76. See e.g., Michael Lane Holt v. Rosalyn Eileen Robertson et al., Pine County District Court File No. C4-03-764 (Tenth Judicial District 2004) (holding that Minn. Stat. § 169A.76 authorizes court to consider punitive damage award but does not supercede Minn. Stat. § 549.20 or abolish its proof requirements).

Juries are likely to increase the amount of general damages that otherwise might be awarded in automobile accident cases simply because of the defendant driver was intoxicated. The thought is not only will they want to punish the drunk driver through the punitive award, but they will inflate the general damage numbers as another form of punishment. Not only does the amount of the verdict increase if the plaintiff successfully adds a punitive damage claim to the case, but so does the risk of personal exposure to defendant driver as automobile insurance policies typically exclude coverage for punitive damage awards. The defendant driver’s insurer will want to protect its insured from that risk to the greatest extent possible. That objective can be achieved by settling cases early. Additionally, the defendant driver may wish to admit causal negligence in exchange for the Plaintiff’s agreement to cap compensatory damages at policy limits. That strategy, if successful, caps damages and significantly decreases the defendant driver’s personal exposure. It also focuses the claim’s defense on damages rather than the insured’s drinking and driving, which may result in a lower than usual general damage award. The attorneys at Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala are eager to lend assistance and answer questions in this changing area of the law.

About the Author:

Paul has experience defending insurance and commercial clients involved in product liability, personal injury, dram shop, and employment cases. A sizeable portion of his practice is devoted to the defense of asbestos claims in various jurisdictions. Paul also has experience defending automobile insurance disputes involving bodily injury and no-fault claims, in addition to uninsured coverage issues. Within his first two years of practice, Paul represented the defense in two jury trials, both resulting in verdicts favorable to his clients. During the same time period, Paul made two successful appearances in the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

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