Decisions Of The Minnesota Supreme Court
Independent Medical Examination
Reider v. Anoka-Hennepin School District No. 11, 728 N.W. 2d 246 (Minn. 2007). In this decision, the Court interpreted Minn. Stat. Sec. 175.155, Subd. 2 (2006), the "neutral physician" provision. When reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the following language from the statute: "When an interested party requests, not later than 30 days prior to a scheduled pre-hearing conference, that a neutral physician be designated, the compensation judge shall make such a designation." The Court stated that other language in the statute that provided discretionary authority to a compensation judge in designating a neutral physician was in effect overruled by the language quoted above. It cited general principles of statutory interpretation which direct that if there is a conflict between a general provision in a statute and a specific provision, the specific provision controls. The facts of this particular case were not unique or complex. The underlying claim was a dispute over primary liability, based upon a Gillette theory of causation, as well as permanent partial disability. Each party relied on their medical expert for their respective positions. The employer requested a neutral physician following a settlement conference and prior to the scheduling of a hearing. The Court determined that the request was "timely," even though a pre-hearing or a Pretrial Conference was not held.
COMMENT: This determination by the Supreme Court will allow for additional procedural options to the parties. It remains unclear what is considered a "timely" request. The statute contemplates that such a "timely" request is one that was made "not later than 30 days prior to a scheduled pre-hearing conference." In this case, there was no pre-hearing conference, but the Court ruled that the request was, nonetheless, "timely." If a Pretrial Conference is scheduled, of course, any request should be made more than 30 days in advance of the Conference. Otherwise, it is recommended that, if a neutral physician is desired, it be requested at the earliest possible time. The statute provides that the "expense of the examination shall be paid as ordered by the Commissioner of Labor & Industry, compensation judge or the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals." If it is the employer and insurer that are requesting the neutral physician, it is very likely that the cost will be borne by the employer and insurer. If it is the employee who requests the neutral physician examination, the judge will have the discretion, of course, to order the employer and insurer to pay for it. There will also likely be an issue regarding how the "neutral" will be selected. When the statute was enacted in 1979, the Legislature specifically required the Department of Labor and Industry to "develop and maintain" a list of neutral physicians. No list was ever developed and that portion of the law was repealed by the Legislature in 2002. Therefore, it is likely that the judge will request that the parties agree on a "neutral," or each side will be required to submit names of physicians and the judge will make the choice.
Statute of Limitations
Roemhildt v. Gresser Companies, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 2007). The employee claimed a low back injury of 08/17/01 and a FROI was filed on 8/23/01. On 8/28/01 the insurer filed a NOPLD, accepting liability, and paid some medical bills. However, on 09/18/01 the insurer filed a second NOPLD, denying primary liability and terminated payment of benefits. When, in October 2004, another employer/insurer brought a contribution claim against the 08/17/01 injury, primary liability was again denied and a statute of limitations defense was asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed the determinations of the compensation judge and the WCCA that the statute of limitations defense failed because the 2001 employer/insurer made payments before denying primary liability for the injury. The Court rejected the argument that the tolling of the statute of limitations ended when the denial of liability was issued. The Court held that the initial payment of benefits constituted a "proceeding" pursuant to Minn. Stat. 176.151(1). This determination is consistent with prior case law holding that voluntary payment of benefits may constitute a "proceeding," thus tolling the statute of limitations. However, what made the 2001 insurer's argument unique was the claim that the tolling of the statute ended when it subsequently denied primary liability. The insurer argued that the three year time period for the claim restarted when the second NOPLD was filed. The Court acknowledged that Minn. Stat. 176.221, subd. 1 encourages employers/insurers to commence voluntary payments even before their investigation is complete, however, found that the language in that provision was too general so as to be interpreted as implicitly overruling case law that payments constitute a "proceeding."
COMMENT: This decision will, in some situations, put employers/insurers in the position of choosing whether to file an incomplete NOPLD, thus risking penalties from the DOLI, or issuing payments and, thus, permanently tolling the statute of limitations.
Falls v. Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc., 726 N.W.2d.96 (Minn. 2007). The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the WCCA which had reversed a decision of a compensation judge, disqualifying the employee from receiving temporary total disability benefits. The judge had found that the employee had refused suitable employment, and therefore, was ineligible to receive temporary total disability benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1 (i). The Supreme Court concluded that the cessation condition in Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1 (i), under which temporary total disability benefits cease if the employee refuses an offer of suitable work, does not apply to work offers made before the commencement of temporary total disability benefits. Since the employer in this case had made its job offer in May 2005, before the commencement of the claim for temporary total disability benefits on June 1, 2005, the Supreme Court held that the compensation judge erred in terminating the employee's benefits. The WCCA's decision reversing the compensation judge was affirmed.